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COMMENTS
ILLINOIS V. CITY OF MILWAUKEE: A WELCOME
ALTERNATIVE TO SNYDER V. HARRIS: AN ANSWER
TO THE ANTI-AGGREGATION PROBLEM OF CLASS
SUITS IN FEDERAL COURTS

I.
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate
waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount
provided in § 1331(a). " 2 Although the decision has been widely
discussed because of its holding that federal question jurisdiction
exists in interstate water pollution cases since such controversies
present questions of federal common law,3 its impact on the considerable body of law construing the "matter in controversy" as a
necessary prerequisite to the existence of both federal question 4 and
diversity of citizenship 5 jurisdiction in federal courts has been wholly
overlooked.6
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, can certainly
be understood to mean that the rule requiring that the jurisdictional
amount in both federal question and diversity cases be evaluated
solely from the viewpoint of the party plaintiff7 is effectively abolished. 8
3406 U.S. 91 (1972).

2 Id.at 98.

3 Id.at 100.
428 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1970).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).

6 No commentator appears to have mentioned this aspect of the decision. However, the "federal common law" idea has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Carton,
State Versus Extra-Territorial Pollution-States' "Environmental Rights" Under
Federal Common Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 318 (1972); Note, Federal Common Law
and Interstate Pollution, 85 HAIv. L. REV. 1489 (1972); Note, Invalid Growth
of the New Federal Common Law Dictates the Need for a Second Erie, 9 HoUsToN
L. REv. 329 (1971); Note, Federal Courts-Jurisdiction-FederalQuestion-Federal
Common Law Is Proper Basis for District Courts Exercise of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 40 U. CN. L. REv. 891 (1971); Note, Original Jurisdiction-Interstate Water Pollution: Alternatives to the Original Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, 47 WAsH. L. REV. 588 (1972); Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Nuisance-State Ecological Rights Arising Under Federal Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 597; Comment, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 121 (1972).
7 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACnCE I 0.97[3], 0.91[1] (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE].

8 This conclusion is justified because the authority cited by Justice Douglas
abandoned that rule. See text accompanying note 120 infra.
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Illinois was not a class action, 9 but its factual basis is typical of class

actions in the environmental field 10 and the issue of whether the
jurisdictional amount requirement in federal court may be satisfied
by aggregating the claims of all members in a class action is closely
analogous." Justice Douglas' casual determination of the issue in
his Illinois opinion is worth considerable attention, for the Court's
9 Plaintiff, the state of Illinois, moved to file a bill of complaint invoking the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1970)
pursuant to U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 2, against four Wisconsin suburbs, the
Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan Sewerage
Commission of the County of Milwaukee. Illinois sued to abate a nuisance
allegedly caused by 200 mdlion gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage
being dumped per day into Lake Michigan in the Milwaukee area. In dismissing
the action on grounds of forum non conveniens, the court held that: (1) While
it was not mandatory that Wisconsin be joined as a defendant it could be made
one and its political subdivisions and their agencies are not "States" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); (2) The appropriate federal district court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)- (3) The jurisdictional amount
requirement of § 1331(a) is satisfied; (4) Polution of interstate waters creates
actions under the "laws" of the United States within the scope of § 1331(a)
because it embraces claims based upon federal common law as well as of
statutory origin.
10 Cf. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), aft'd,
469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Feb. 20,
1973); City of Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1971).
See text accompanying notes 101-09 infra.
11 The problem of aggregation of claims to meet the amount in controversy
requirement, whether by joined or class plaintiffs, has spawned much discussion.
Some of the better treatments of the subject are: Dobie, JurisdictionalAmount in
the United States District Court, 38 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1925); Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1931); Note, Aggregation of Plaintiffs Claims to meet the Jurisdictional Minimum Amount Requirement of the Federal District Courts, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 106 (1931); Shulman
& Jaegerman, Some JurisdictionalLimitations in Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J.
393 (1936); Comment, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 336 (1937); Kalvin & Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941); Note
JurisdictionalAmount in Class Actions, 39 ILL. L. REv. 178 (1944); Note, Federal
Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818 (1946);
Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court Jurisdictions: (I) 29
ST. Jom's L. REv. 1 (1954); Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal
Court Jurisdictions: (II), 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 183 (1955); Comment, Amount in
Controversy in Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CALIrF. L. REV. 601 (1958);
Note, FederalJurisdictionalAmount: Determination of the Matter in Controversy,
73 HAsv. L. REv. 1369 (1960); Simeone, ProceduralProblems of Class Suits, 60
Micn. L. REv. 905 (1962); Fraukel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967); Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, 52
MnqN. L. REV. 509 (1967); Note, Jurisdictional Amount in Class Actions:
Diversity of Citizenship, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1101 (1968); Note, The
FederalJurisdictionalAmount and Rule 20 Joinder of Parties,53 MnN. L.REv. 94
(1968); Comment, Federal Courts: Effect of New Federal Civil Procedure Rule
23 on Aggregation of Claims, 70 W. VA. L. REv. 232 (1968); Note, Aggregation
of Claims in Class Actions, 68 COLUm. L.REv. 1554 (1968); Kaplan, A Prefatory
Note to Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 497 (1969)Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional
Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 601; Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure-Aggregation of Claims in Class Action, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 202 (1969);
Wright, Class Action, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1969); Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregationof Claims: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE L.J. 1577 (1970);
Note, Federal Civil Procedure-Aggregation of Claims, 42 LOYOLA L. REV. 187
(Continued on next page)
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adoption of a "plaintiff or defendant viewpoint" rule' 2 would seem to
eradicate the prohibition against aggregating the claims of class members in order to meet the monetary requirement for diversity juris3
diction.'
In determining the "matter in controversy," 14 courts must decide

initially whether to determine the amount from the defendant's or
plaintiff's point of view. The traditional and majority rule in federal
courts has been to view the amount in terms of the "value of the
right" asserted by the plaintiff, 15 while the alternative test is to
appraise the "value of the right" as it affects either the plaintiff or
defendant, whichever amount is greater.16 With single party litigants,
in only a few cases will the choice of standard be determinative as to
the existence of federal jurisdiction. 17 But where there are multiple
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

(1972); Maraist & Sharp, After Snyder v. Harris: Whither Goes the Spurious Class
Action? 41 Miss. L.J. 379 (1970); Note, Aggregation Doctrine Continues to Limit
Class Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 354 (1970); Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring
Class Actions In the Federal Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 Prrr.
L. REv. 89 (1971); Comment, In a Class Action Where the Claims are Separate
and Distinct, Each Member of the Proposed Class Must Satisfy the Amount in
Controversy Requirement for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 HOUSTON L. REv.
852 (1972); Comment, Class Actions for Consumer Protection, 7 HAnv. Cw¢.
IGirrs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 601 (1972); Stausberg, Class Actions and Jurisdictional
Amount: Access to a Federal Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis, 22 AM.
U.L. REv. 79 (1972); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 602 (1953), Annot., 2 A.L.R. Fed. 18
(1969), Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 372 (1970).
See also 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZoFF, FEDEAL PnAcTcE AND FRocE-DuE §
569 (C. Wright ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HoLT'ZoF];
C. WIGH- THE LAW OF FEDERAL COunTS §,36 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as WIUGHrr; I MooRE IUT0.90-0.99. (Editors note: These citations are listed in
strict chronological order for the benefit of the reader who wishes easily to examine
area.) into what is actually involved
in this
critical
the development
12 This rule of
calls
for acommentary
common sense
inquiry
in the case from the viewpoint of either the plaintiff or defendant. See text ac1S
Fortune,
Pendant
37. "Pendenting Parties,"
See generally WUeGr
infra.Jurisdiction-The
notes 120-44
Problem§ of
companying
,
(1972).
,&
n.75
1,
20
L.
REV.
Frrr.
34 U.The
rule renders the antiviewpoint
adoption of the plaintiff or defendant
aggregation principle inconclusive since the matter in controversy from the defendant's view would simply be the composite, or "aggregation," of the plaintiff
parties' claims.
The first jurisdictional amount requirement was $500, set out in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. The minimum monetary amount required
was raised to $2,000 in 1887 by the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, again
revised upward to $3,000 by the Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091, and again
by the Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415 to the present level of $10,000.
For a complete history, see 1 MOORE 1110.2[1] and 0.90[1].
15 See 1 MOORE I 0.91[1], at 827 and cases cited at n.6 therein. See also
Dobie, JurisdictionalAmount in the United States District Court, 38 HAsv. L. REv.
735 (1925).
16 Seenote 14 supra.
17 For example, a plaintiff with $9 000 in alleged damages may seek to
permanently enjoin a $1,000,000 a year business as a nuisance. And even after
a viewpoint is chosen, serious problems may remain in assessing the "value of the
right" to the particular party. Cf. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298
U.S. 178 (1936).
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parties to a lawsuit, the choice becomes important indeed and will
often be determinative.
II.
The availability and usefulness of the class action device as a
tool for effecting private remedies in federal courts for both public
and private wrongs are greatly expanded by the adoption of the
"plaintiff or defendant" viewpoint rule. In order adequately to appreciate the conceptual and practical problems generated by both
the traditional rule and the contrary view applied in Illinois, a review
of the history of the anti-aggregation rule and its relationship to federal
class action is necessary.
8
Aggregation rules derived from the common law of joinder.'
These rules were carried over intact from early joinder cases and were
applied to class actions by the federal courts.' 9 From the outset, the
issue was recognized as a fundamental jurisdictional dispute and not
20
merely one involving practicality, efficiency or procedural fairness.
In Oliver v. Alexander,21 the Supreme Court held that "separate and
distinct" claims of plaintiffs could never be aggregated in order to
meet the jurisdictional amount.22 The Court's rationale was that
federal courts would be acting beyond their statutory power if they
entertained claims jointly that they could not adjudicate individually.
After all, when parties join their claims merely for their own convenience, it was argued, this should have no effect on subject matter
jurisdiction-the very power of the court to hear the case. But where
the right or claim involved was "individual" and "common" to all
joined plaintiffs, aggregation was permitted, the rationale being that
when the interest of one party could not be adjudicated without
directly affecting the interests of the joined parties it was logical to
the matter in controversy as the combined interests of the
denominate
23
parties.
Application of the "separate and distinct" versus the "undivided
18 Note, Aggregation of Claims In Class Actions, 68 COLT-m. L. REv. 1554,
1555-57 (1968).
19 Cf. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
20 The Supreme Court has been confronted with this problem for a long time.
See Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 229 (1814).
2131 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
22 The jurisd:ctional amount required then was $500. For a complete geneology of the requirement, see note 14 supra.
231n effect, aggregation was permitted only in modem Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19 compulsory joinder situations. See Note, Aggregation of Claims in
Class Actions, supranote 18, at 1556.
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and common" dichotomy was precarious at best, often generating
24
merely a conclusory rather than a functional analysis by the courts.
To a certain extent the courts exacerbated the confusion by developing
alternative and not wholly consistent tests to determine the nature of
the interests involved. Early cases seemed to develop a judicial rule
providing that if the defendant had an interest in the allocation of
the distribution of the judgment among the plaintiffs, the rights of
25
the plaintiffs were "distinct" and aggregation was not permitted.
2
6
In Pinel v. Pinel, the Supreme Court ratified the rule when it held
that parties presenting "separate and distinct" claims in one suit
could not aggregate them for jurisdictional purposes. Only when
the interest claimed was identical to all the parties-and not merely
when the claims presented identical features-was aggregation permitted.2 7 The Court apparently reached this conclusion by deducing
that when the interest of one party could not be satisfied without
altering the rights of the others it was fair to say that the interest
of all the parties constituted the "matter in controversy."
This formulation of the mutually exclusive categories of "separate
and distinct" as opposed to "common and undivided" soon fell into
24 See Blume, supra note 11. Compare Hawley v. Fairbanks, 108 U.S. 548
(1883) with Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S. 36 (1884), cited in Note, Aggregation of
Claims in Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1559 & n.35 . Both cases deal with
virtually the same fact pattern. Joined judgment-creditor plaintiffs sued debtortownships to compel the levy and collection of a tax to satisfy their claims. In the
former
2 5 case aggregation was disallowed while in the latter it was permitted.
See Gibsen v. Shufeldt, 122 U.S. 27 (1887) where the Supreme Court, in
disallowing aggregation, expressly formulated such a test:
[W]hen property or money is claimed by several persons suing together,
the test is whether they claim it under one common right, the adverse
party having no interest in its appointment or distribution among them,
or claim it under separate and distinct rights, each of which is contested by the adverse party....
Id. at 30. Cited in Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, supra note 18, at
1559 & n.33.
In retrospect, it seems the Court was attempting to say that if the cause of
action of the joined plaintiffs involved a specific fund or entity, the
in
controversy was that mnd, and aggregation of the individual claims to matter
a portion
of it was permitted. This could sometimes place form above substance, since
parties could obtain federal jurisdiction by the manner in which their pleadings
referred to the amount sought to be recovered. Although the Hawley and Davies
cases are irreconcilable on their facts, they can be explained in terms of this
specific fund notion. In Hawley, where aggregation was denied, the parties sought
the ,levy of a tax that would precisely compensate the total of the individual plaintiffs claims, whereas in Davies, where aggregation was permitted, the parties and
the court specified the issue as whether or not a specific "special tax" should be
levied, the proceeds of which were to be distributed pro rata among the joined
plaintiffs.
20240 U.S. 594 (1916).
27 Id. at 596. The Supreme Court referred to the doctrine as being settled
law, citing Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464, 479 (1891) and Troy Bank v. Whitehead
& Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
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disuse. Later, courts began to speak in terms of "essential parties 28
Under this formulation courts transformed the Pinel rationale into a
rule of law: aggregation of multiple claims could only occur when
none of the joinder plaintiffs could individually adjudicate his case
without directly affecting the rights of the other joined plaintiffs.
Such a standard narrowed the range of fact situations in which
aggregation was allowed, and it provided a concrete test that could
be applied uniformly. 29 The defendant would have little interest in
which plaintiff might be entitled to more or less of the judgment
unless the adjudication of one claim would expand or cut off the
claims of others.30
Such was the state of the law when class actions began to surface
as an effective procedural tool. The class action developed as a method
of avoiding the inequities and inadequacies that sometimes resulted
from application of joinder principles. 3' Initially, class actions were
recognized only in equity 32 to provide an adequate remedy in situations where mere numbers would otherwise inhibit the right of a
group to obtain relief.33 Rule 38 of the Equity Rules of 1912 read:
When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impractical
to bring them 3all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the whole. 4
28
See, e.g., Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945) and Knapp
v. Banker's Securities Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1954), where the courts felt
that employment of the term "essential" would alleviate the difficulties of trying
to classify a party as either "necessary'1 or "indispensible."
29 Professor Moore had been perhaps the strongest proponent of such a test.
See 3A MooRE if 23.13, at 3480.
30 A good example is a class action for an antitrust violation claim. Although
each member could clearly sue separately, the defendant's only real concern is his
liability and not the extent each plaintiff would benefit from it. There is no longer
a jurisdictional amount requirement for antitrust claims. See note 90 infra.
31 The class action first developed in England as an exception to the English
equity rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties. See Knight v. Knight,
24 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1734). It also was revived as a mere expansion of that
rule. See City of London v. Richmond, 23 Eng. Rep. 890 (Ch. 1701), decree aff'd
1 Eng. Rep. 727 (H.C. 1702). Interestingly here, class actions were proper not
only where joinder of an interested party was impossible because of jurisdictional
requirements, but also where joinder was not mandatory but only desirable to
insure judicial efficiency. See, e.g., Sheffield Waterworks Co. v. Yeomans, 7 L.R. 2
Ch. App. 8 (1866). For good discussions of the history and evolution of the class
action, see 3B MOORE if 23.02[1], and J. STORY, COmmENTABIES ON EQUITY PLEADING 127-42
(5th ed. 1852).
2
3 Courts consistently held that class actions were strictly an equitable procedure. See, e.g., Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1853),
McNarey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 616, 618-19 (N.D. Ohio 1933). However, some actions were allowed at law. See Penny v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 138
F.2d 33769 (8th Cir. 1905).
See generally 3B MOORE if 12.02[1] et. seq.
34
Eauity R. 88, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). This in turn emerged from Equity
Rule 48 of 1840.

CONENTS
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 35 the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated. Rule 2336 was referred
to in advance of promulgation of the Rules as a "substantial restatement
of Equity Rule 38 . .. as that rule has been construed," 37 but it
extended the availability of the class action to all applicable causes of

action, "whether formerly denominated legal or equitable."3 Nevertheless, rule 23 created new complexities in class action procedures.
Its chief draftsman, Professor Moore, 39 employed a far more technical

scheme than was to be found in the comparatively straightforward
equity rules. The rule prescribed three types of class actions, defined
in terms of the jural relationships of the parties of the class: where
the rights or interests of the class were: 40 (1) joint and common,

(a true class action); (2) several, but affecting specific property,
(hybrid); and (3) several, but having common factual or legal questions (spurious).41
Applying the Pinel principle to these classifications, courts adhered
to the rule that aggregation of claims of the individual class members
was permitted only in "true" class actions.42 The fact that some
3528
U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
36
Original Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 82 L.Ed. 1563, 1582 (1987), provided in
relevant part:
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all
may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right
sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of the
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may effect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
rights
and a common relief is sought.
37
See SB MOORE fT23.0112], at 23-17, quoting AovisoRY COMM. ON RULEs
FOR CrviL PROCEDURE, REPORT (1932).
38 Id. See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th
Cir. 1948).
39 Moore first published his theory in Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Some Problems Ra.sed by the Prelimina2 Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 570-75 (1937)
where he relied heavily on an earlier analysis by J.STORY, supra note 31, § 97. Old
rule 23(a) was taken almost verbatrm from Moores article. While the rule did
not employ the labels "true," "hybrid" and "spurious," Moore's use of the terms
was universally adopted (see 3B MooRE U 23.13). See Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(I), 481 HAnv. L. REv. 356, 377 (1967).
0 3B MOORE IT23.08.
41 See original Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, supra note 36.
42 For example, the interests of the class members were "joint, common and
undivided" in the sense that without the class action device the suit could not be
brought at all unless all the members of the proposed class could be compelled
to join. See, e.g., Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.
Del. 1949).
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members of the class who were not named parties failed to meet the
diversity or jurisdictional amount requirements was irrelevant.43 Of
course, in a "hybrid" or "spurious" class action, all of the named parties
plaintiff had to meet the jurisdictional amount since their claims were
"separate and distinct."
As might have been expected, the application of such ambiguous
theoretical terms to actual controversies produced confusing and
inconsistent results.44 A rule such as "the action has to be true to
permit aggregation" was unhelpful, since whether an action was
"true" or whether the right involved was "common" was really the
same inquiry. 45 For example, in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,46 the
Supreme Court held the action to be spurious where the plaintiff
class sued to enjoin a state from unconstitutionally collecting fees
from a group of interstate caravanors and dismissed it for want of
jurisdictional amount. Yet the same day, the Court held in Gibbs v.
Buck47 that a class suit by the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers [an unincorporated association] to enjoin
Florida's enforcement of a statute which prohibited the association's
price-fixing policies was a "true" one and permitted aggregation to
48
satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
43
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 856 (1921). The Supreme
Court held that in a class suit only the representative parties of record need fulfill.
the rule of complete diversity mandated by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (8
Cranch) 267 (1806). See 3B MooRE f123.18, at 23-2951 and Kalvin & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 703-04 &
n.66 (1941). Applying the rule of Ben-Hur, it becomes irrelevent that all absent
members of the class could not meet the requisite jurisdictional amount in the sense
that in no classification of the class action rule could absent parties defeat jurisdiction. For no apparent reason though, once jurisdiction over the representative
parties was established, intervention by members of the class who bad no independent basis for jurisdiction-neither diversity nor jurisdictional amount-was
clearly permitted in "true" and "hybrid" actions, (see, e.g., Gentry v. Hibernia
Bank, 154 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Cal. 1956)). Besides jurisdiction and intervention,
other matters sueh as venue and tolling the statute of limitations varied according
to which subclassification was involved.
44 See Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1556 &
n.15.
45
Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure, Note on Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.
98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Note]. See also Kaplan, supra
note 39.
46 806 U.S. 583 (1939).
4478 307 U.S. 66 (1939).
In neither case did the Court elucidate a functional or even nominal
test or standard in determining whether or not an action is "true or "spurious."
Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not deal with the issue in a single case litigated
under old rule 23, although the circuits were totally confused as to the "true,"
"hybrid" and "spurious" trichotomy. Clark and Gibbs were both brought under
Equity Rule 38 before old rule 23 became effective. Compare Erech v. Braecklein,
133 F.2d 12 (10th Cir. 1943) with Sturgeon v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d
819 (6th Cir. 1944). In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F.2d
527, 533 (8th Cir. 1950), the court openly admitted that the action was brought

(Continued

on next page)
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Rule 23 was revised in 1966 as part of a general revision of the
rules governing parties and joinder of claims.49 Although the revisers
achieved their immediate goals of replacing the former rule's abstractions with pragmatic functional considerations,50 the format of the
new rule parallels that of the old. Actions under revised rule 23(b) (1),

(2) and (3) roughly correspond to the old "true", "hybrid" and
"spurious" categories respectively. 51 Actually, these labels retain only
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

properly under old rule 23(a) (3) and was thus "spurious," but aggregation was
allowed because:
.. the common relief sought was protection by injunction from wrongful
interference with the common right of all the members of plaintiff's class
to the employment they had and depended upon to earn their living.
Clearly the same reasoning would have required aggregation in Gibbs. See Note,
Aggregation of Claims In Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1561.
49 The current rule is FED. R. Cry. P. 23. The pertinent part is:
(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interest; or
(2.) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
the grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
reliefs with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
5
oWright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1969).
5 At the Eighth Circit s Judicial Conference in 1967, Judge Marvin Frankel
suggested that:
In reshuffled and sharply defined forms, the first two of the new subdivisions, (b)(1) and (b)(2), embrace the old "true" and "hybrid"
and a still open-minded range of other forms. New subdivision (b) (3)
(Continued on next page)
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historical significance today, except in regard to the issue of aggregation where they have remained outcome-determinative. At any
rate, current rule 23 is a far better tool than its predecessors for

effectuating its threefold purpose: providing an effective remedy to
compensate the "smaller guy" whose claim is negligible when compared with the costs of enforcing it; 52 achieving the procedural goals
of best utilizing time, effort and expense, and of attaining uniformity
of result; 53 and enforcing standards of social conduct in situations
where-without the class action device-the deviating party might
never be required to conform.5 4 These three policy aims can be
termed briefly as "justice, efficiency and prophylaxis.
Today, the minimum prerequisites for maintenance of a class action
remain considerable. The standards prescribed by the rule itself are
stringent enough, 56 but the "extra-legal" problems a particular course
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

bears many resemblances to the old "spurious" category, but it effects
vital changes....
Frankel,
Some PreliminaryObservations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,
43 (1968).
52 The language is that of Professor Benjamin Kaplan Reporter of the revised
rule, quoted in Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Juage's Point of View, 32
AN~rrrusT L.T. 295, 299 (1966). Professors Kalvin and Rosenfield refer to the
typical class plaintiff as one who "finds himself inadvertently holding a small stake
in a large
controversy." Kalvin & Rosenfield, supra note 43, at 684.
53
Advisory Comm. Note 102-03; Kaplan, supra note 39, at 390.
54 Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
BUFFA.O L. REv. 438, 433-37 (1960).
55 Comment, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2
ECOLOcY
L.Q. 533 549 (1972).
5

6 See generally BARRON & HOLTzOFF §§ 567 et seq. (Supp. 1971); 3B MooRE
ff 23; Donelan, Prerequisitesto a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. REv. 527 (1969); and Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1969).
The standards are extensive. At the very minimum the proponant must:
I. Adequately define the class (See 3B MooRE fI 23.04 and cases cited
therein);
II. Meet all four requirements of subdivision (a), whichare: (1) the
numerical reqirement in terms of the "impacticability of joinder" and not the
"impossibility' of it (See 3B MooRE ff 2305 and cases cited therein. See Demarco
v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); (2) the existence of common questions of law or fact (for a unique strategy employed to meet this prerequisite, see
SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), application for stay
pending appeal denied sub nom. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S.
1207 (1972). The case involved ICC failure to comply with NEPA regulations
in failing to file an environmental impact statement when imposing a surcharge on
railroad rates for recyclable refuse. This was held to constitute a common question
of law or fact because the issue of whether or not an administrative agency has
failed to follow proper procedures is common to all members of the class.); (3) the
typicality of the class plaintiff's claims or defenses- and, (4) the ability of the
named party to adequately represent the interest o? the class (the latter two go
to the constitutional mandate of adequacy of representation: See Hansberry v. Le,
311 U.S. 32 (1940). See generally BARoxr & HoLTzOsr § 567 and cases cited
therein); and
III. Properly fit his case into one of the subclassifications of subdivision (b).
For an excellent discussion concerning the problem of determining in which sub(Continued on next page)
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57
Beyond all
of action may generate can be just as insurmountable.

this, the added obstacle of meeting the jurisdictional amount require(Footnote continued from preceding page)

classification a particular action must be brought, see Advisory Comm. Note. The
"predominance" and "superiority" requirements of (b) (8) actions alone present
extensive practical problems, the outcome depending on the type of action brought
and the particular facts presented. For example, as to the predominance requirements, antitrust actions have gone both ways. See, e.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row
1969); Minnesota v. United States
Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill.
Inc., 271
Delight,
1968);
(D. Minn.
5591967);
F.R.D.Cal.
Corp.,
Steel
F.
Supp.
72244(N.D.
contra,
SchoolSiegel
Dist.v.ofChicken
Philadelphia
v. Harper &
and
con
can
be
made
in
mass
accident
cases
(see,
e.g.,
Advisory
Comm.
Note 103.
pro
arguments
Rowv Pubishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Good
(1972).
Rv. 1615 relevant
Actions,
60 CAI.F. L.catalogue
Mass Accident Class
Contra,
As
to theComment,
superiority
rule's
non-exhaustive
criteria
(see
Advisory requirement,
Comm. Notethe
104)
presents
formidable hurdles toof even
the
most analytical of minds. Various methodologies applying these criteria can be
seen in Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968); Iowa
v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 408
F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969); Fisher v. Kleyz, 46 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
57 "Extra-legal" problems caused by the logistics of mere numbers quickly
become
legal ones.
For an
discussion of these "manageability" problems,
see A~f.EnIcAN
COLLEGE
OFexcellent
TITI LAWYERS,
REPORT AND RECOMMNDATIONS OF
THE SPECIAL COnrrra ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL Rur.ES OF CiviL PRocEDvUE
(1972.).
Manageability problems may entail the costs and administration of: (a) sending suflcient notice to absent class members; (b) processing the inquiries and
"opt-outs";
(c) a conducting
to every id.
member
of the
(which the
defendant has
right to do discovery
under theasRules-see
at 34);
(d) class
providing
notice
of settlement or an adjudication of liability to the absent class members; (e)
processing
claim
(necessitating
individual findings
fact?); (f) h andling
appeals of proofs
absent ofclass
members;
(g) administering
a fluidofrecovery
fund if that
technique is the only feasible method of insuring that absent class members
actually share in the damages award; ( ) allocating attorney's fees; (i) providing
a hearing for class members who may want to have the action dismissed (suppose
the defendant bought out their claims); (j) providing special employees or
masters to oversee all of this.
While any one of these may well provide a court the impetus to dismiss the
action in class form, deener problems continue to lurk behind the express language
of the rule. For example, is the constitutional standard of due process in terms
of
the "fundamental
vitiated
by: (1)
abandoning
the
requirement
of actual fairness"
notice of of
thethe
suitprocedure
tol
aabsent
members
of the
class in order
to make the action manageable; (2) denying the defendants right to discovery or
his right to a jury trial on the issue of damages as to all members of the class to
maintuin manageability; (3) the procedural coercion into settlement apparent to
the defendant, especially f the fluid recovery device is deemed acceptable by the
court; (4) the alteration and dilution of the substantive law of the case where
such is necessary to insure the feasibility of maintaining the suit in class form
see.
e.g.,Ky.Fisher
Wolfinbarger,
CCH FED.
l court
p. II 93,235, at 91,454
(W.D.
1971),v. where
in an antitrust
class SEC.
actionL.the
felt no inhibitions
about dispensing with a traditionally essential element of the
crimafacie case in
order that the suit would be practical in class form. The court s blatant disregard
for the substantive law was only exceeded by the candor in which it explained,
...
e proof of actual reliance by thousands of individuals would not be feasible."
Id. at 91,454; (5) the legal ethics involved in cases where the attorneys provide the
money to finance the administration of the class suit an are the only ones to
benefit financially from its successful adjudication.
a good
example
of the
and
procedural 391
unfairness
that
singleFor
class
suit ma
generate,
seejudicial
Eisen v.burden
Carlisle
& Jacquelin,
F.2d 555
(2da
Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting), where most of the above problems
actually were involved. As Judge Lumbard accurately described it, the case was
truly a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." Id. at 572.
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ment must be hurdled by the class plaintiff whose only basis for suing
in federal court is the federal question or diversity jurisdiction of the
forum.
III.
In Snyder v. Harris58 the Supreme Court refused to hold that the
matter in controversy could be satisfied by the total of all claims that
could be asserted as a single cause of action in a class suit.59 The
plaintiffs had urged that new rule 23, by abandoning the old focus
on the "undivided interest" or the "single right" involved, also abolished
the anti-aggregation doctrine of Pinel, which through judicial construction, had made the now-abandoned categories outcome-determinative.60 The Supreme Court had granted certiorari to settle a
conflict between decisions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits6 l and a
decision of the Tenth Circuit 62 regarding whether, in a diversity suit,
it was permissible to aggregate the claims of all parties to a 23(b) (3)
action. In a seven to two decision, the Court held that such aggregation
was not warranted. 63 They perceived the Pinel doctrine as a jurisdictional requirement that "separate and distinct" claims could not be
58 394 U.S. 832 (1969).
59 Id. at 338. The Court actually held that "joint" or "common' claims could
be aggregated but claims that are "separate and distinct" could not.
60 There were no Supreme Court cases that decided the issue under the 1938
class action rule (old rule 23). The cases relied upon by the Snyder Court-Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939)
and Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939)-were brought under old Equity Rule 38
before the federal civil rules went into effect. Thomson v Gaskill 315 U.S. 442
446 (1942) seemed to approve the anti-aggregation doctrine in dictum, but did
not apply it.
61See Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 911
(1968), affd, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 375
F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
62 See Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 393
U.S. 911 (1968), re'd, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
63 The decision actually involved companion cases before the Court. Mrs.
Snyder, an Arizona citizen and shareholder in a Missouri corporation, sued on
behalf of herself and "all those similarly situated." She accused the named
defendants of conveying their stock for an exaggerated premium above its fair
market value in order to gain control of the company. She claimed that Missouri
law entitled all the stockholders to share in this "control premium" and demanded
that it be distributed to them. Mrs. Snyder claimed $8 740 for herself and
approximately $1,900,900 in damages for the remaining stocholders. The district
court dismissed the action for want of jurisdictional amount. Snyder v.Harris 268
F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mo. 1967). In the companion case, Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn,
389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), a Kansas plaintiff filed a class action against a
foreign corporation selling natural gas in Kansas. He claimed that the defendant
corporation collected an illegal franchise tax from him in the amount of $7.81,
but added that other illegal collections from the approximately 18,000 class members would certainly meet the jurisdictional amount. The district court's overruling
of the defendant's motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction was
affirmed.
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aggregated to attain the $10,000 matter in controversy requirement.
Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, wrote that: "[tihe doctrine that
separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated was never, and
is not now, based on categories of old rule 23 or of any rule of
procedure."0 4 In other words, an interpretation of new rule 23 to
permit aggregation in subsection (b) (3) situations would be impossible, since inherent limitations on the rule-making power preclude a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or a judicial interpretation of a rule
from expanding the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts.6 5
Since an amendment to rule 23 could not modify the diversity statute,
it could not affect the settled anti-aggregation doctrine. 66
In a strong dissent, Justices Douglas and Fortas adamantly maintained that, although the jurisdictional amount requirement was certainly a statutory one, the anti-aggregation rules were court made
and should likewise be judicially harmonized with the spirit of the
new rule. The dissent argued particularly that since the new rule
extended res judicata effect to all class members, whether absent or
party to the action, 67 the claims of the entire class constituted a single
matter in controversy.
If one makes a purely legal analysis, it cannot be argued that rules
of procedure, promulgated by the judiciary, can alter the statutorilyconferred jurisdiction of a court, despite the fact that there is "a long
history of changes in jurisdictional requirements effected by the
rules."6 8 The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,69 by which Congress
delegated its rule-making power to the Supreme Court, states that
"... rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify and substantive
right. . "..,o
In fact, civil rule 82 provides that "[tihese rules shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts .... 71 Since the anti-aggregation doctrine of
Pinel is based upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the substantive law generated by a jurisdictional statute-and not compelled
by any procedural rule-the fundamental doctrine of rule 82 clearly
64Snyder v. Harris, 894 U.S. 332, 336 (1969).
65 This principle has been reiterated on many occasions. See Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 591
(1941); and Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426, 434 (1925).
66 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337-40 (1969).
67See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3).
68J. MooRE, A. VEsTAAL & P. Knu.AN,
MoonE's MANUAL 14.07[6], at 989
(1968). For a forceful argument along similar lines, see Kaplan, supra note 39, at
400. For two examples, see text accompanying note 162 infra.
6928 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
70
Id.
71
FED. R. Crv. P. 82.
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prevents the conclusion that new rule 23 could have an effect on the
Pinel doctrine. 72 In its earlier form rule 23 was based upon the same
conceptual relationships that the Pinel Court had relied upon when
it mandated that aggregation could only occur when the claims asserted were "true" rather than "spurious." But former rule 23 did not
define these relationships for jurisdictional purposes.
Under new rule 23, however, the extension of res judicata to
class members does permit a forceful legal argument that blanket
aggregation of all class members' claims is a reasonable interpretation
of the jurisdiction statute.7 3 Since the legal efficacy of each of the
claims presented is adjudicated at the same time and becomes final
in one judgment, is it not accurate to state that the totality of all the
claims is the matter in controversy? In the most literal sense, a claim
has to be in controversy before it can be bound by a judgment. Thus,
while the Pinel anti-aggregation rule may have been clearly appropriate under old rule 23, since no interpretation of the jurisdiction
statute could permit a court to maintain that a particular claim was
in controversy if the judgment did not even affect it, the same rule
is clearly inappropriate under the new rule 23 and should no longer
apply. Despite this logical claim to validity, the argument remains
that mere rules of procedure cannot expand the power of courts to
hear certain cases and thus that new rule 23 simply cannot produce
this result. Otherwise, the extension of res judicata effect to the claims
of all class members by the new rule violates the fundamental principle of rule 82.74
72
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1940), the Supreme Court
foresaw the argument. The majority stated:
There are other limitations upon the authority to prescribe rules which
might have been, but were not mentioned in the Act; for instance, the
inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute.
Cited in Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1563 &
n.56.
73 In addition to the Fortas dissent in Snyder, some commentators lend support
to this proposition. See, e.g., 2 BAnRON & HOLTZOFF § 569.
74 This precise issue is examined in Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 54 CEO. L.J. 1204, 1219 (1966);
The new rule poses the dilemma that despite the express disclaimer of
expansion of jurisdiction in rule 82, a literal adherence to the commands
of rule 23 would extend jurisdiction to citizens not previously within
the court's power. That is, inclusion of all members of the former
spurious class in the judgment-the clear mandate of rule 23-could be
construed as changing the manner of meeting the requirements of diversity and jurisdictional amount.
In 1937 the framers of old rule 23 explicitly declined to incorporate a section
offered by Professor Moore on the effects of judgments in the three types of class
actions because they felt that it was beyond the scope of the rules. See Anvisosy
Co~miTrE ON RULEs FOR CirvL PmOcEnunE, REPORT 60 (1937), cited in Note,

(Continued on next page)
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Obviously courts developed the Pinel doctrine without regard to
the effect of res judicata. If the res judicata effect of the judgment
were dispositive on the issue of aggregation, parties who utilize the
permissive joinder procedure of rule 20 would be permitted to aggregate their claims since each such party is bound by the judgment. But
aggregation was not permitted in permissive joinder cases when the
anti-aggregation rationale became a formal rule of statutory construction in Pinel.75 The syllogism is faulty, however, because many
claims which can be litigated in a single permissive joinder suit may
involve totally separate legal and factual questions; they may not be
proper cases for a class action and thus an argument for aggregation
would not apply. At least one court has departed from the former
rule on permissive joinder cases by holding that parties with "separate"
claims or liabilities less than the jurisdictional amount may join under
rule 20 with others who do meet the requirement. 76
Neither res judicata nor the "separateness or distinctiveness" of
the claims is an issue in regard to rule 18,77 which provides at present,
that all of one party's claims against another may be joined. Under
this rule a kind of aggregation is automatic. If the anti-aggregation
doctrine of Pinel, as applied in Snyder, were held to apply to rule 18
cases, as it logically should, it would disallow aggregation in situations
where it is now permitted. This, of course, would be an equally
flagrant violation of rule 82.78 That parties asserting claims based upon
completely different causes of action, questions of law and fact, and
occurrences or transactions enjoy automatic aggregation of their
claims for jurisdictional purposes while multiple members of a single,
clearly definable class, asserting claims which involve a single cause
of action containing common questions of law and fact arising from
the same occurrences and transactions are barred from aggregating
their claims because they are somehow "separate and distinct" seems
to be an unwarranted and unnecessary anomoly. The Supreme Court's
holding in Snyder must be viewed as the result of a sincere belief that
if the matter in controversy were to be interpreted to include the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1564 & n.63. See also

Comment, The Mumbo Jumbo of Class Actions-An Attempt to Alleviate, 19 Wyo.
L.J. 232, 285 (1965).
75 Cf. Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).

70 See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 F. Supp.
905 (N.D. III. 1966), noted in Comment, 81 HARv. L. REv. 480 (1967).
77 FED. B. Civ. P. 18. See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 503 and 1 MooRE II

0.97[1].
78

The allowance of aggregation of wholly inconsistent claims under rule 18

could be indicted as permitting the mere convenience of a party to be the basis of
the court's power to hear the case.

KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL

[Vol 62

composite of all claims that happened to be brought together and
litigated in one action, the jurisdictional amount statute would be
rendered meaningless. The line had to be drawn somewhere.7 9
Notwithstanding the fact that a rule of procedure cannot compel a
particular construction of a jurisdictional statute, new rule 23 does
present a different context in which the statute must be applied.
Courts ought at least to consider the possibility of interpreting the
statute congruously with the procedural context in which the issue
arises.80 They are not compelled to follow a principle conceived
in different circumstances, but in fact have a duty to overrule previous
interpretations if the result is anomolous in the new context in which
the principle must be applied. 8 '
In Snyder,82 Justice Black concluded that congressional reenactment
of the jurisdictional amount statute as previously worded amounted to
an implicit adoption of the judicial anti-aggregation doctrine of Pinel.
The dissent maintained that Congress had not even considered the
Pinel doctrine. 83 The fact is that the issue was not specifically discussed in the entire legislative history of the statute-which pre-dates
the first Judiciary Act of 1789.84 Even though the statutory language
has changed somewhat over the years, 85 it has never included any
"separate and distinct" requirement.88 At any rate, it is unreasonable
to assume that congressional reenactment without explicit considera79This is a prime example of the wisdom of the proposition that lines are to
be drawn on blackboards and not in judicial opinions. The problem here is not
merely a matter of degree where lines can properly be drawn as principles of substantive law; e.g., "proximate cause." Involved here is a functional distinction
between the nature of joinder suits and the nature of class actions. In the former
the judgment can be in favor of some of the claimants on some of their claims
and for or against others on some of their other claims. In the latter, the claims
of the class succeed or fail as a unit. To allow aggregation in rule 18 cases where
some of the claims need not have been asserted in that suit to begin with and
where the success or failure of any one claim may or may not bear any relationship
to the success or failure of another while aggregation is denied in a procedure
where all claims are literally adjudicated as one claim is to deny "matter in controversy" its common-sense meaning.

80 Kaplan, supra note 39, at 399-400. In his dissent in Snyder, Mr. Justice
Fortas argued this proposition. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
81 See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAsic
n ME MAKIR AND APPLICATION or LAw 1368-80 (tenit. ed. 1958).
82 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).
83

P OBLFIS

Id. at 350 (Fortas, J., dissenting).

84 See Comment, Federal Civil Procedure-Aggregationof Claims, 17 LoYoLA_
,
L. REv. 187, 193 & n.32 (1970).
85 Tephrase "matter in controversy" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1970)
(federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) (diversity) has been held the
equivalent of "amount in controversy." See Blackbun v. Portland Cold Mining
Co., 175 U.S. 571 (1900); Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167 (1889).

86 That a purely semantic analysis of the statute provides virtually no insight
to the question was observed by one writer in Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class
Actions, supra note 18, at 1568.
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tion of the issue implicity adopts or rejects the particular judicial construction of the statute. As Justice Black himself has noted, such a
canon of construction would impose an immense burden on Congress
to reexamine all judicial interpretations of a statute before enacting
it.8 7 At the very least, Congressional silence with respect to the Pinel
anti-aggregation doctrine ought to be considered "as consistent with a
desire to leave the problem as fluid as... with an adoption."88 Policy
considerations aside, 9 there is certainly no conclusive answer in either
the language or the legislative history of the statute as to whether

Congress intended to incorporate the Pinel doctrine.
IV.
Notwithstanding Snyder, several factors may combine to mitigate
the harshness of the anti-aggregation principle. Many federal statutes
expressly provide jurisdiction independent of the amount in controversy.90 The vast majority of public lawsuits (a common sense
alternative to the class action if it were not for the inherent difficulty
of pursuading an attorney general to commence a particular suit) can
be brought by relying on specific federal laws which contain detailed
review provisions, 91 or by incorporating parts of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 92 Several courts have viewed the APA as a legitimate
jurisdictional statute upon which environmentalists and consumer
advocates can rely.93 That the class action is a particularly effective
procedural tool to enforce standards of conduct is well documented
by its extensive employment in these areas.94 Other strategies may be
employed if at least one party plaintiff has a claim in excess of
87

See Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 465-66 (1948) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
8
8 Cirouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946).
89
Policy arguments both for and against the application of the Pinel rule in
the class action context of new rule 23 are discussed in the text accompanying
notes90117-25 infra.
See e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1335 (statutory interp eader), 1336 (ICC), 1337 (interstate commerce and antitrust matters),
1338 (patents and copyright), 1339 (postal matters), 1340 (internal revenue),
1343 91(civil rights), 42 U.S.C. 9 1857-2(a)(1) (clean air amendments) (1970).
See, eg, Federal Power Act § 313(b), 16 U.S.C. 825(b) (1970), which
was the basis o jurisdiction to challenge the proposed location of a power plant in
Scenic
denied, Hudson
407 U.S.Preservation
926 (1972). Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
9925
3 U.S.C. 94 702-04 (1970).
See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1970). See also Reingold, A Primer on Environmental Litigation, 38 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 113, 116-17 (1971).
94 For a contrary view, as might well be expected from two recent appointees
to the Justice Department who believe in the superiority of a governmental administrative agency's ability to handle problems in these areas, see Crompton &
Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 EcoLoGY L.
REV. 407 (1972).
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$10,000. Permissive intervention might be allowed to accommodate
class members who do not meet the jurisdictional amount by permitting them to join as parties of record with the party who does.95
Rule 42(a) may be used, inter alia, to effect consolidation. If this is
not feasible or is denied, convenience procedures9" or quasi-consolidation98 may be of aid. These latter considerations can be said to merge
with the non-exhaustive considerations of the superiority of the class
99
action format to these alternatives as required by rule 23(b) (3).
V.
Before one considers alternative procedural options available
where at least one member of the class has the requisite $10,000
claim, it should not be mistakenly believed that Snyder necessarily
compels each and every class member to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Although some courts have so held, it is still
an open question. 100 In Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,101 plaintiffs
filed a 23(b) (3) class action based on diversity jurisdiction for impairment of their rights caused by defendant's alleged pollution of Lake
95

This is only a theory because under old rule 23 intervention by class members whose claims fell short of the monetary requirement was allowed in "true"'
and "hybrid" actions, but the courts were split as to its appropriateness in "spurious"
ones. See generally 2 BABRON & HOLTZOFF § 569 and 3B MoorE 9 23.12. But
since the trend is to allow permissive joinder of parties who lack the minimum
monetary claim permissible (see text accompanying note 76 supra), it is but a
short step to allow class members the same, especially since they are bound by the
judgment pursuant to new rule 23.
9; The Supreme Court had made it clear that under FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 18-20
and 42 the impulse should be toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Without compromising basic fairness
to the parties, joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged. See,
e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
97 For example, by employing 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1970) a district court may
transfer any civil action "to any other district or division where it might have been
brought" for "the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interests of
justice."
98 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970) provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
p ending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multi-district litigation ...
upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings .. .will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.
99 See the brief expose of the manageability problems that could arise, supra
note 57.
100 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992, 996-97 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967); Zahn v. International Paper Co. 53
F.R.D. 480 (D. Vt. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41
U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1973). Contra Diercks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d
453, 456 (1st Cir. 1969); Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Auth.,
410 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally 3B MooRE 1123.95.
10153 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), affd, 469 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1973).
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Champlain. The class, defined as "all lakefront landowners and
lessees in the towns of Orwell, Shoreham, and Bridgeport, Vermont,"
consisted of about 200 members. The court agreed with the defendant's argument that jurisdiction was wanting since it was "not
credible" that every owner had suffered pollution damages in excess
of $10,000.102 The court refused to permit the suit to proceed as a
class action because, in its view, the Supreme Court had "clearly and
unambiguously" held that each class plaintiff must be able to claim
the requisite jurisdictional amount.103 However, the court did concede
that:
We reach our decision today with great reluctance ... [t]he
requirement that each class member meet the jurisdictional amount
clearly undermines the usefulness of Rule 23(b) (3) class suits,
because the problem of defining an appropriate class over which
the court has jurisdiction will often prove insuperable. 10 4
The Second Circuit sympathized with such concerns' 0 5 but agreed with
the result because it felt that the policy of the jurisdictional amount
statute-that of checking the rising caseload in federal courts-must
take precedence over the policies favoring class suits. 10 6
In City of Inglewood v. Los Angeles,107 the Ninth Circuit held that
each class member had to establish the jurisdictional amount, but it
granted a compromise measure that the Zahn court explicitly refused
to allow. Believing it objectionable to dismiss the representative
action in an entirely preemptive manner merely because the complaint averred the existence of the required jurisdictional amount for
an indeterminant number of class members, the court held:
Rather the court should decide for the individual plaintiffs
which can recover and which cannot. Once these matters are resolved the court can begin seeking a more substantial showing from
the plaintiffs as to the type of proof they will be able to present.
Whenever appropriate the court can dismiss the complaints as to
those parties who are clearly shown 10to8 be unable to meet the
requirements of jurisdictional amount.
Thus, the case was remanded to determine which members could not
meet their burden of providing sufficient evidence of a claim amounting
10253 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
103 Id. at 431-32.
104 Id. at 433.
1o 469 F.2d 1033,

1035 (1972).
100 Id. The validity of such an argument is discussed in the text accompanying
note 163 infra.
107451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971).
108 Id.at 954.
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to at least $10,000 in property damages allegedly incurred from the
operations of the Los Angeles International Airport. The court ordered
dismissal as to those plaintiffs only. 0 9
Certainly the result in Inglewood is preferable to that in Zahn,
but the extra burden of conducting pretrial examinations on the extent
of damages and proofs of claims of all class members would be a very
considerable one. At the very least it would greatly minimize any
advantages of proceeding with a class action. The tragedy is that
Snyder does not necessarily compel such results. Both the dissent in
Snyder"10 and commentators on the case"" predicted that such dire
consequences could result, although the Snyder holding was not entirely dispositive of the then hypothetical issue.
In a few recent non-damage cases, plaintiffs have experienced
success in avoiding problems with meeting the jurisdictional amount
requirement by pursuading the court to measure the amount from
the defendants view rather than their own. 11 2 This is reasonable, for
example, where an injunction is called for rather than damages. An
individual plaintiff may receive only a small benefit compared to the
cost to the defendant of either remedying the nuisance or shutting
down a profitable business. Beyond this, at least one court has found
it convenient to avoid completely a determination of the amount of
monetary damages involved, and thus to evade any anti-aggregation
problems, by simply valuing each class member's claim at more than
$10,000.11 Of course, such an approach is only possible where the
claims involve an intangible right of the class members.
The anti-aggregation mandate of Snyder might also be avoided
because of an absence of clarity as to the requirements of rule 23(b).
Subtle definitional anomolies between subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (3)
are susceptible to various interpretations." 4 The class actions under
new rule 23 are not wholly coterminous with the "true," "hybrid,"
and "spurious" claims of former rule 23. Thus, while it is true that all
109 Id. at 953.
110 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 343 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
111 See, e.g., WmlTrr, § 72.
112

See, e.g., Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. 1l1.

1971); Bieckele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (alternative holding). See also Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Amount in Controversy in
Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CAnip. L. REv. 601 (1958).
113 See Bieckele v. Nolfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
where the court held that "the right of each member of the class to live in an
environment free from excessive coal dust' exceeds $10,000. The court also held
that defendant's fight to continue operating its coal loading facilities was worth
more than
$10,000. Id. at 855.
11 4 See generally SB MooRE ffff23.31 et seq.
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suits arising under (b) (3) would be clearly "spurious" and aggregation
would be denied, courts would not merely deny aggregation in all
(b)(3) actions and permit it in all (b)(1) and (b)(2) suits. 115
However, courts would be likely to construe (b) (1) claims as "joint"
in nature and to permit aggregation because of the definitional criteria
within the subdivision itself.116 In other words, since it may prove
difficult to distinguish whether a particular case is either a (b) (1) or
(b) (3) action, 11 a successful molding of the facts into the (b) (1)
category might well avoid the effect of Snyder. For example, Snyder
itself could be considered a (b) (1) (B) situation. Is there any rational
distinction between the "typical claim for monetary relief" in a
securities fraud case brought under 23(b) (3) and a class taxpayer's
suit under 23(b) (1) (A)"18 to invalidate a municipal bond issue or a
suit under 23(b) (1) (B) by stockholders to compel the declaration of
a dividend rightfully due them but wrongfully withheld? Is there
such a thing as recoverable refund as opposed to "true damages?'
Both are functionally compensatory. Considering the extreme difficulty
of delineating the "nature of the interest" in many cases and the
possibility of "subdivision (b) shopping," an enterprising lawyer might
do well by exploiting the situation.
VI.
It is submitted that all this conjecture is rendered moot by the
Supreme Court's determination of the issue in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.) 19 A joinder case, Illinois seems to avoid completely if not
overrule Pinel.The unanimous opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas,
315

396-97.6

See Advisory Comm. Note 100-04; Kaplan, supra note 39, at 395 & n.150,

11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
117 See generally Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving

Difficulties and New Problems Require FurtherAmendment, 52 MINN. L. REv. 509,

515-27 (1967).
118 An interesting dilemma is posed by Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation of Claims: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE L.J. 1577 (1970). Suppose Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) with its famous holding that:
[a] taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the
taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending
power.
bad geen brought as a class action. Since the suit would cause tax monies to be

rerouted from the illegal appropriations, the suit could arguably have been either a
(b)(1)(A) or a (b)(3) action. According to the Court in Snyder, unless a
citizen had paid a sufficient amount in taxes that $10,000 of his share had been
included in the illegal appropriation (totally impossible of course), the suit could
not have been entertained. Luckily, everyone was so excited about "standing"
that the issue was never introduced by the plaintiff, the defendant or the judges.
.10 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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cites three cases and two secondary authorities 120 demanding and
effecting the adoption of the "Defendant's View" doctrine. 121 As one
authority has noted, "This case effectively abolishes the plaintiff only
viewpoint rule."1 22 The Illinois Court, in holding that the jurisdictional
amount requirement for an original proceeding in federal district court
was satisfied by relying on cases which employed the "Defendant's
View" doctrine, established as a rule of law that the "matter in controversy" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (because Illinois was a
federal question case) and § 1332(a) (because some of the cases
relied upon were diversity actions) 123 is to be construed to mean that
the jurisdictional amount may be satisfied by the effect of the judgon either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, Illinois replaces the rule
of Pinel as the controlling interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes
where the subject matter jurisdiction of the court is challenged because the matter in controversy does not exceed $10,000.
Substituting the rule of Illinois for that of Pinel, what remains of
Snyder? Since Snyder was a mere application of the Pinel antiaggregation doctrine to class actions, does Snyder remain good law
now that Pinel has been displaced? Obviously, whether or not the
claims of individual class members are "separate and distinct" and
thus cannot be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes is no longer
dispositive when the nature of the plaintiffs' claims need not even
be considered in determining the amount in controversy. The court
need only inquire whether either party stands to lose $10,000 or more
by an adverse judgment in the case.
Ronzio v. Denver & Rio Grande Western,12 4 cited by the Court in
Illinois as authority for construing the jurisdictional amount statute as
it did,'2 5 was the first case expressly to enunciate the "Defendant's
View" doctrine. Judge Phillips formulated the rule as follows:
120 Id. at 98, citing: Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat &
Power Co., 239 U.S. 212 (1915); Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2

Black) 772 (1862); Ronzio v. Denver R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (1940);
C. Wmrrr §§ 117-19; Note, FederalJurisdictionalAmount: Determination of the
Matter2 1in Controversy, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1369 (1960).
1 See generall? 2 BAUIMON & HoLrzoFF § 24; Wright § 37, at 117-18 and

cases cited therein; Ilsen ,&Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in FederalCourt Jurisdiction (I), 29 ST. JoHN's L. REv. I (1955); Note, JurisdictionalAmount in the
Federal
DistrictCourts, 4 VAD. L. REv. 146 (1950).
12 2 See Fortune, supra note 13.
Considering such an effect it is wondered whether certain members of the
Court were consciously aware of their assent to this aspect of the case. Certainly
one is justified in feeling that Chief Justice Burger, who is understandably eager to
protect the federal court system from an already bulging caseload (see Burger, The
State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1048 (1972), may have misconstrued the ultimate effect the decision could have.
123 See cases cited note 120 supra.
124 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
125 406 U.S. at 91, 98.
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In determining the matter in controversy, we may look to the
object sought to be accomplished by the plaintiff's complaint. The
test for determining the amount in controversy is the pecuniary
result 26
to either party which the judgment would directly produce.'
While the Supreme Court had never indicated, until Illinois, which
test was proper for the determination of the jurisdictional amount,
there is not a single decision of the Court in which a controversy

involving single party litigants was denied jurisdiction because the
monetary amount requirement was satisfied from the defendant's
viewpoint but not from the plaintiffs. The Court has treated the issue
tangentially on occasion. A principle case, also relied upon by Douglas
27
in Illinois,1
is Mississippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward,128 which involved an action for the abatement of a bridge as a nuisance. The
Court held that the removal of the bridge was the matter in controversy
and "the value of the object must govern." 29 Later, in Adam v.
Smith,130 a case challenging the validity of an election to determine

the situs of a county seat in the Territory of Dakota, the Supreme
Court offered some support to the "Defendant's View" rule by indicating:
[tihe pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be determined not only by the money judgment prayed.., but in some
cases... by the pecuniary result of one of the parties immediately
3
from the judgment.' '
The Court deviated, however, in St. Paul Co. v. Red Cab Co.,".2 where

it surmised that "the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim
apparently is made in good faith." 3 3
Even if it were argued that Illinois does not "effectively abolish"
Snyder, the strongest position that could be taken is that the principle
is now unsettled and the courts are therefore free to choose either
126
127
128
120

Ronzio v. Denver R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (1940).

406 U.S. at 91, 98.

67 U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1862).
Id. at 487. Such a "test," if it could be euphemistically so termed, was
unclear if not wholly unascertainable. WnsGnr § 34, at 117 explains: "The leadin,
case is so cryptic as to shed little, if any, light on the direction in which it leads.,
Judge Learned Hand unsuccessfully attempted to determine just what the "object"
was that governed the value of the case in M & M Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y.,
186 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1950).
130 130 U.S. 167 (1889).
131 Id. at 175, cited in Strausberg, Class Action and Jurisdictional Amount:
Access To a Federal Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis, 22 Am. U.L. REv.
79, 104 (1972).
132 303 U.S. 283 (1937). The suit, which entailed an action on an insurance
contract, evidently had been removed from state court.
133 Id. at 288.
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alternative. 13 4 Given a choice, courts ought to apply the rule of
Illinois, for in class actions the defendant's "interest" is certainly a
more rational basis for determining the "matter in controversy" than
is the amount of an individual class member's claim. It makes no
difference that Illinois is a joinder case while Snyder was a class action.
The impact of a judgment on the defendant is the same regardless of
the number of plaintiffs suing. Additionally, in a class action, a single
party may institute the suit as a "private attorney general" for others
able to assert the same right. 35 Functionally there is no difference
between this type of class suit and one involving single party litigants.
Since the decision in Snyder, some courts have indicated a desire
to apply the "Defendant's View" doctrine to class actions, but have
been reluctant to do so in the face of that decision. Berman v. NarragansettRacing Association'30 was a class action against a race track
for wrongfully withholding distribution of purses to winners of races
pursuant to an alleged agreement. The contract called for the racing
association to pay the horseowners a certain percentage of profits.
Each horseowner's claim was for a different amount and was less
than the jurisdictional requirement. The First Circuit held that the
claim was not barred by the jurisdictional amount requirement for
two reasons: the plaintiff class had a "common and undivided right
of interest" in their claims as a whole, permitting aggregation under
the holding in Snyder, and,
[t]he pecuniary result which the judgment would directly produce
would be the awarding of a fund of several millions to the class.
We think it is the entire fund, and not what each pursewinner's
eventually be, that determines the amount
individual share will
137
in controversy here.
The court went to great lengths to permit the suit to continue in class
form in federal court regardless of the Snyder holding. Although the
court held that "a common and undivided right of interest" was
shared by the individual class members in each others claims, it could
just as easily have determined that those claims were "separate and
distinct," as indeed they were. Obviously, the court was paying mere
lip service to Snyder while actually speaking in terms of Illinois.
134 See Kennedy, Valuating Federal Matter in Controversy: An Hofeldian
Analysis in Symbolic Logic, 85 TENN. L. REv. 428 (1968), in which the author
attempts to fix the status of the rule through the use of symbolic logic. He fails.
135 That he might do so is expected as the "prophylaxis" function of a class
action is recognized by the authorities. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
136414 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1087 (1970).
13 Id. at 314, cited in Strausberg, supranote 131, at 105.
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The opposite result was reached in Lonquist v. I.C. Penny Co.,' 38
a class action by credit account holders alleging that defendant's
department stores enacted usurious interest rates from them, ranging
from $.41 to $189.69. While the aggregate amount claimed far exceeded $10,000, the Tenth Circuit relied on Snyder and dismissed the
action. The court expressly distinguished Berman by stating that there
the claims involved a "common and undivided right," while in Lonquist
the claims were "separate and distinct." The conclusion that claims
based on an alleged contract to distribute percentages of a pari-mutual
pool to purse winners is somehow less separate and distinct than
claims for the refunding of usurious interest to possessors of charge
accounts makes it clear that nearly two centuries of experience in
attempting to apply "the character of the interest" test to multipleparty claims does not necessarily make one proficient at the task.' 39
The Longquist court weakly attempted to distinguish Berman by obsingle
serving that Berman relied on Ronzio, a case involving only a 40
plaintiff and a single defendant. Such a distinction is untenable.
Finally, in MassachusettsState PharmaceuticalAssociation v. Federal Prescription Service,141 a class suit brought by Massachusetts
pharmacists seeking to enjoin the defendant Iowa Drug Company
from ignoring a Massachusetts state court injunction that was issued
to restrain the defendant from soliciting business within Massachusetts,
the Eighth Circuit dismissed the action for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. The court correctly based its decision on a finding
that "the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the requisite jurisdictional amount would be present [even] if aggregation is allowed."
While reciting Snyder's rule that separate claims could not be aggregated, the court went on to acknowledge that:
...there is some authority for the proposition that the amount in

controversy is valued by the thing to be accomplished by the
action as to either the plaintiff or the defendant, whichever is

higher...

142

138 451 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970).

139 The "character of the interest" of the plaintiffs in the two cases is even more
similar than that involved in Hawkley and Davis, discussed at note 25 supra,
where the metaphysical distinction between "the fund" and "the claims to the
fund" was outcome-determinative. See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
Professor Chaffee may have said it best when he remarked that be usually had as
much trouble telling a common right from a separate one as he had in telling

whether some ties were blue or green. See Z. CHAnFE, SomE PROBLEMs OF EQUITY
257 (1950). To this day the courts are still unable to determine when a single

right is sought to be enforced by plaintiffs with common and undivided interests.
The cases are set out in Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 372 (1970).
140 See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
141 431 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1970).
142

Id. at 132 n.1.
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The court continued to explain why it would not apply "the defendant's standpoint test"143 in the future:
[I]n light of Snyder ... the plaintiff's viewpoint rule is the only
valid rule.... To hold otherwise would in effect
permit aggregation
of claims contrary to the teaching in Snyder. 4 4

Exactly. And now that Illinois is available, courts may validly shed
the inhibitions created by Snyder.

VII.
While Illinois does obviate the necessity of applying the antiaggregation principle, whether or not courts will do so may still
depend upon their own analysis of the effect of such a decision on
the policies embodied in the jurisdictional amount requirement statutes.
Diversity cases present the conflict because nearly all federal question
cases have been specifically excepted from the requirement of a
minimum jurisdictional amount.145 Moreover, Snyder, and the case
upon which it relied, Pinel, were both diversity cases and it is doubtful
whether the majority in Snyder believed their holding would affect
federal question cases as it has.146
In Snyder, Mr. Justice Black relied on two often asserted purposes
of the jurisdictional amount requirement in diversity cases to support
the Court's decision on policy grounds: preservation of the independent
authority of state courts 147 and limitation of the federal caseload. 14
The first purpose is interrelated with the total concept of comity, 149
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Examples

of these specific exemptions are listed in note 90 supra and accompanying text.
146 In fact, the majority opinion is silent on the matter. Its basic concern was
the opening of federal courts to suits that could otherwise be maintained in state
courts. See text accompanying notes 147-51 infra. Of course, such a consideration
does not concern federal question cases.
147 394 U.S. at 341.
148 Id. at 342. See generally Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount and
Rule 20 Joinder of Parties,53 MnmN~. L. REV. 94, 96-102 (1968).
149 The independent authority of state courts is truly the basis of the doctrine.
Comity is merely the term employed by courts and scholars to describe the policy
consideration that branches of the federal government, especially its judiciary,
ought to avoid any needless conflict with a particular state in the administration
of that state's own affairs. Comity has been the primary outcome-determinative
factor in at least two major notions limiting federal jurisdiction the abstention
doctrine (where it underlies a federal courts obligation to withaold its exercise
of equity jurisdiction to permit state courts to initially interpret their own state
laws) and the Erie doctrine (where it is manifested in the requirement that in a
diversity case a federal court must apply the substantive law of the state in which
it sits). Congress employed the same concept as a basis of the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) which forbids proceedings except in exceptional,
specific situations. See generally Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: the
Changing Role of the FederalJudiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 241 (1972).
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which has been instrumental in the evolution of the parameters of
federal jurisdiction. But the allowance of a class action in federal
court, which may entail millions of dollars, can hardly be indicted as a
grating intrusion into a state's domain. The fundamental purpose of
federal diversity jurisdiction is to provide an alternative forum for
suits involving state law and out-of-state courts. 50 If Congress really
intended that the jurisdictional amount statute should exist merely to
insure that all cases of primarily local interest be maintainable only
in state courts, then abolition of diversity jurisdiction would be the
proper remedy. 151 Congress has decreed that out-of-state litigants
could be relieved of any possible local prejudice only when the matter
in controversy is in excess of $10,000. Snyder denies that privilege
to those foreign members of a class whose claims happen to be labeled
as "separate and distinct." Illinois restores it.
On the other hand, limiting the federal caseload to insure efficient
judicial administration is a cogent rationale for the restrictive interpretation of the jurisdictional amount statute in Snyder. Certainly a
court is justified in relieving an already crowded docket of the added
burden of deciding a great number of small claims. 1 52 But in adjudicating claims where the defendant stands to lose in excess of
$10,000, courts are not "frittering away their time in petty controversies."15 3 They are deciding major controversies for which Congress
clearly intended to provide a federal forum. 154 That policy is readily
evident in cases arising in states that provide for class action procedures. The class action anti-aggregation rule of Snyder would fore150 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). The need
for providing an alternative forum is premised on the traditional theory that
foreign plaintiffs or defendants might suffer from local prejudice if forced into
state courts.
1
15 Whether or not diversity jurisdiction itself ought to be modified or
abolished is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Note, Analysis
of the ALl's Approach to the State FederalJurisdictionalDilemma, 21 Am. U.L.
REv. 287 (1972). However, it is clear that the fear of local prejudice is one of the
few remaining arguments for diversity jurisdiction. Two obvious arguments
contra are: (1) the most significant prejudices remaining alive in America today
are along racial, ethnic, religious or sexual lines, and (2) even if prejudice does
exist along local geographical lines diversity jurisdiction does little to defeat it
because the judges and juries in federal courts come from the same area as their
counterparts in state systems.
152 That the dockets of the United States Courts are in a critical state is a
well known fact. See generally Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972,
58 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1972); Corrigton, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv.
542 (1969); Wright, The Overloading Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration,42 TExAs L. REv. 949 (1964).
i1a 1958 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. Nmvs 8101. See also Gauldin v. Virginia
Winn-Dixie,
Inc., 370 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1966).
54
'
See Professor Wrighes discussion in 1 BARON & HoLTzoFr § 24, at 47.
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close a defendant's opportunity to remove his case to federal court
even though he may be subject to a judgment in excess of the federal
jurisdictional amount requirement. 155 Irrespective of the defendant's
opportunity to remove his case to federal court even though the suit
may have been otherwise brought in federal court, in some states, such
as New York,' 56 the plaintiff class members remain without an effective
remedy. Although the civil procedure of most states contains some
form of class action,'57 these state remedies are generally inadequate,
inefficient, ineffective and inappropriate. 158 Understandably, the use
of the class action device in state courts has been relatively rare.' 59
Moreover, where the development of substantive federal policy is a
prime consideration in a case, it is important that a federal forum be
afforded. 16 0 In addition, where the magnitude of a potential class
action is national in scope, a state-by-state adjudication of the matter
is not as efficient or effective as a single litigation in federal court.161
Thus, the unwarranted denial by Snyder of federal jurisdiction over
many class actions is unfortunate, especially since federal courts have
15528 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
156 Grayner v. Rockfeller, 204 N.E.2d 627, 631, 256 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1965);
Society Million Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374
(1939).
157 Nineteen states still have class action provisions adopted from old federal rule 23. Others have similar provisions grounded upon general terms and
imprecise criteria. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 128 (1960), which provides:
[Wihen the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or where the parties are numerous, and it is impractical to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of58 all.
- Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal
Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 39 (1971). See
generally Note, FederalRules of Civil Procedure,Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims
to Meet the JurisdictionalAmount, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 154 (1969).
159 F. JAMEs, CvrL. PocEUaE § 10.18, at 495 (1965).
160 This is the other aspect of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee which was heralded
by commentators (see the articles listed note 6 supra). In areas where Congress
has demonstrated federal concern by legislative enactments, but which do not
expressly create a private right of action in a particular situation, federal courts
are now empowered to develop substantive federal policy in the form of federal
common law under the federal question statute. As the Illinois Court said:
[Tihe remedies which congress provides are not necessarily the only
federal remedies available. "It is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned." 406 U.S. 91,
103 (1972).
161 "It is basically the access to the Federal Court System for national class
action abuses that is at issue." Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm.
on Consummer Protection of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st &
2d Sess., ser. 91-48, at 213 (1970) (statement of Ralph Nader). Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, stated:
[W]ithout access to a class action, there can be no law and order for vast
numbers of deceived, cheated and swindled Americans.
S. 1h_'. No. 1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970), cited in Strausberg, supra note
131, at 94.
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requirements in the light reflected
often interpreted jurisdictional 162
by the policies of the civil rules.
A valid distinction can be made between the proposition of limiting
the workload of overcrowded federal courts by preventing petty claims
from inundating the federal system and the proposition of barring
access to a federal forum to meritorious class claims involving very
substantial sums of money and possibly substantive federal policies.
It is one thing to construe strictly a jurisdictional requirement in
deference to the federal caseload, but quite another to deny the
substantive statutory right of access to a federal forum on that basis.
The sole, clear and consistent purpose of the jurisdictional amount
requirement is the prevention of petty claims from flooding federal
courts. 163 If the case is not a petty one, then the availability of a
federal forum in diversity of citizenship situations is guaranteed. The
Supreme Court provides in Illinois a clear method for determining
whether or not a case is petty. Where the value of the dispute exceeds
$10,000 from either the plaintiffs or defendant's view, then the consequence that the federal caseload might increase is no reason to
deny access to the system. Just as the mere convenience of the parties
is not a suitable premise to grant it.
In addition to the purposes of the jurisdictional amount statute,
courts must also consider the purposes of civil rule 23. Of the three
major public policy aims of the modem class action, 6 4 that of protecting the rights of small individual claimants against a more powerful adversary is the single one which can only be effectuated by
applying the rule of Illinois. The other goals, achieving judicial
economies with uniformity of result and providing a standard of
behavior upon which all parties could rely to be legally sufficient in
the future, are sought to be accomplished by the criteria catalogued
within the rule itself.16 5 Once the propriety of the class action device
2
16 Prime examples are the concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.

Under pendent jurisdiction, at least one court has granted jurisdiction notwithstanding aggregation. See, e.g., Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85
(D. Mont. 1969). As for the concept of ancillary jurisdiction in the civil rules, see
generally Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal
Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1964); Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules,
64 HArtv. L. REv. 968 (1951). See also Brandt v. Olsen, 179 F. Supp. 363 (N.D.
Iowa 1954) where the court acknowledged:
The federal courts have employed the concept of ancillary jurisdiction in
an effort to balance federal jurisdictional requirements with the liberal
provisions of the Rules as to additional parties.
Id. at 370.
163 See H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958); Wrticr § 32.
164 See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
16 5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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as a procedural tool is established, as determined by the prerequisites
of the rule,' 66 the accomplishment of these ambitions is solely attributable to the adjudication of the suit in the form of a class action.
The several considerations that determine the very availability of rule
23 in a particular fact situation are those which determine whether
judicial economies, with uniformity of result and enforceable standards
of conduct, will be insured by utilization of the class form. They are
the same question. A correct preliminary determination that the case
is a proper one to be pursued in class form is to achieve these goals.
If they would not result then the court is incorrect in allowing
the case to proceed as a class action. 167 In counterperspective, the aim
of "taking care of the smaller guy"168 is not a condition precedent to
the availability of rule 23. However, its employment to do so inheres
in the nature of the class action concept. The Advisory Committee
which drafted the new rule,' 6 9 lower courts, 170 and commentators 171
have stipulated that rule 23 is necessary to assure an adequate legal
mode of protecting small but similar claims of many plaintiffs against
one defendant or of one plaintiff against many defendants. While
this policy goal is generally extraneous to both interpreting the jurisdictional amount statutes and determining the propriety of rule 23's
utilization in a particular fact situation, it remains an intrinsic notion
of rule 23's raison dcetre. Aiding the small clamant is not merely one
of a whole new range of possible uses of the class action format under
new rule 23, it is a fundamental premise upon which the rule was
promulgated. 172
166 Some of the problems involving these prerequisites are discussed in notes
56 and 57 supra.
167 Theoretically, the preliminary determination that the case is a proper one
to be maintained in class form is to achieve these two goals. If they would not
result, then the court is incorrect in permitting the case to proceed as a class
action to begin with. In reality, courts often compromise conflicting considerations
in determining if common questions of fact and law predominate and if the class
form is the superior method of adjudicating the claims. It is submitted that if the
two goals would not be accomplished by hearing the action in class form, then
neither predominance nor superiority is established and the suit should not be
allowed to continue as a class action.
168 See, Frankel Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTrTRUST 69
L.J. 295, 298 (1966).
1 Advisory Comm. Note 104. See also Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to the Class
Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rayv. 497 (1969).
170 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
171 See, e.g., Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant,
10 B.C.
72 IND. & Com. L. REv. 501 (1969).
'
See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court stated:
To assert that the minute interests of the parties before the court is a
factor which militates against allowing a class action is to ignore the spirit
(Continued on next page)
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Until the rule of Illinois is forcefully employed the Snyder prohibition against aggregation of claims will continue to prevent innumerable aggrieved "small fellow" 1 73 consumers from bringing a class
action in federal court. Alas, "Snyder has already provided the altar
74
for the sacrifices of its progeny."'
Since "[t]he 'promise' of the federal class action was nipped in the
bud by the unfortunate decision in Snyder v. Harris,"175 Congress has

unsuccessfully attempted to respond by proposing special legislation
specifically providing for the maintenance of consumer class actions
in federal courts. 176 As a judicial measure, one commentator has

suggested that the concept of "protective jurisdiction" should be

177
adopted to justify federal jurisdiction over all consumer class actions.
The Supreme Court has offered in Illinois what the drafters of these
measures hoped to provide. While the Snyder decision continues to
impede the development of the federal class action as an efficient
means of vindicating the substantive rights of consumers, environ-

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of Rule 23 since, as we have seen, if the plaintiff's claim is very large a
class action is rendered unnecessary, the main purpose of the class action
is to provide a means of vindicating small claims. It would be anomalous
to hold that only major financial interests can make use of it.
Id. at 495.
173 Kaplan, supranote 169, at 498.
174 Strausberg, supra note 131, at 97.
175 Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm. on Consumer Protection of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1970) (remarks of Jay Diskoff).
170 See, e.g., S.3210, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (proposed as an amendment
to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1970). It has been
reintroduced in Congress as S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
110. S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) § 206(b) provides:
(1) A consumer who has been injured by an unfair consumer practice
may sue as a representative party on behalf of all for redress of such injury
ninety days after the date on which the Federal Trade Commission has
been notified of such practice if such action may be maintained as a class
action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that no consumer shall be a member of such class unless he shall have paid or become
obligated to pay an amount greater than $10 in any transaction as a
result of such practice.
(2) Any action under this subsection may be brought in the district
courts of the United States and shall be governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Cited in Strausberg, supra note 131, at 96.
177 Under this theory, Congress could grant jurisdiction to federal courts over
matters in which there is a legitimate federal interest to be protected within the
realm of "arising under" in art. III of the Constitution. Since there are several
federal laws already existing in the field of consumer protection e.g., Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13 1631-44, 1671-77 (1970) federal jurisdiction
over consumer class actions would be well on its way. The theory was first
espoused in this form by Professor Mishkin. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question!"
in the District Courts, 53 COLrUM. L. RE~v. 157 (1953). See also Note, Protective
Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring Jurisdiction
on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Action, 69 MicH. L. REv. 710 (1971).
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mentalists and others, the rationale of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
stands ready to accommodate their interests. While the advent of a
new rule of procedure cannot itself modify the meaning of a jurisdictional statute, a Supreme Court decision certainly does. While some
courts may still persist in playing "character of interest roulette," they
need not do so. Courts may feel uninhibited in "taking care of the
smaller guy" by opting for the rule of Illinois.
Gerald F. Dusing
Editor's Note: As this issue went to final printing, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided Zahn v. International Paper Company,
the complete effect of which is not certain, since the United States
Law Week Summary was not received by the printing deadline. An
addendum to Mr. Dusing's Comment, if necessary, will appear in
Volume 62, No. 2.

